Abstract. The state explosion problem remains a major hurdle in applying symbolic model checking to large hardware designs. State space abstraction, having been essential for verifying designs of industrial complexity, is typically a manual process, requiring considerable creativity and insight.
Introduction
During the last two decades, temporal logic model checking [Clarke and Emerson 1981; Clarke et al. 1983] has become an important application of logic in computer science. Temporal logic model checking is a technique for verifying that a system satisfies its specification by (i) representing the system as a Kripke structure, (ii) writing the specification in a suitable temporal logic, and (iii) algorithmically checking that the Kripke structure is a model of the specification formula. Model checking has been successfully applied in hardware verification, and is emerging as an industrial standard tool for hardware design. For an extensive overview of model checking, please refer to Clarke et al. [1999a] .
The main technical challenge in model checking is the state explosion problem that can occur if the system being verified has components that make transitions in parallel. A fundamental breakthrough was made in the fall of 1987 by Ken McMillan, who was then a graduate student at Carnegie Mellon. He argued that larger systems could be handled if transition relations were represented implicitly with ordered binary decision diagrams (BDDs) [Bryant 1986 ]. By using the original model checking algorithm with the new representation for transition relations, he was able to verify some examples that had more than 10 20 states [Burch et al. 1992; McMillan 1993] . He made this observation independently of the work by Coudert et al. [1989] and [Pixley 1990; Pixley et al. 1991 Pixley et al. , 1992 on using BDDs to check equivalence of deterministic finite-state machines. Since then, various refinements of the BDD-based techniques by other researchers have pushed the state count up to more than 10 120 [Burch et al. 1991] . The widely used symbolic model checker SMV [McMillan 1993 ] is based on these ideas. The results reported in this paper have been implemented in NuSMV [Cimatti et al. 1998 ], a stateof-the-art reimplementation of SMV.
Despite the success of symbolic methods, the state explosion problem remains a major hurdle in applying model checking to large industrial designs. A number of state reduction approaches have been proposed to reduce the number of states in the model. State reduction techniques include symmetry reductions [Clarke et al. 1996; Emerson and Sistla 1996; Emerson and Trefler 1999; Ip and Dill 1996; Jensen 1996] , partial order reductions [Godefroid et al. 1996; Peled 1993] , and abstraction techniques [Cousot and Cousot 1977; Graf and Saïdi 1997; Long 1993; Clarke et al. 1994] . Among these techniques, abstraction is considered the most general and flexible for handling the state explosion problem.
Intuitively, abstraction amounts to removing or simplifying details as well as removing entire components of the original design that are irrelevant to the property under consideration. The evident rationale is that verifying the simplified ("abstract") model is more efficient than verifying the original model. The information loss incurred by simplifying the model however has a price: verifying an abstract model potentially leads to wrong results, at least if performed naively. Consequently, abstraction techniques can be distinguished by how they control the information loss. Over-approximation [Clarke et al. 1994; Kurshan 1994] and under-approximation techniques [Lee et al. 1996; Pardo and Hachtel 1998 ] keep the error one-sided, that is, they admit only false negatives (erroneous counterexamples) and false positives, respectively. Over-approximation techniques systematically release constraints, thus enriching the behavior of the system. They establish a relationship between the abstract model and the original one such that correctness at the abstract level implies correctness of the original system. In contrast, under-approximation techniques systematically remove irrelevant behavior from the system so that a specification violation at the abstract level implies a specification violation of the original system. Other techniques based on abstract interpretation [Cousot and Cousot 1977; Dams et al. 1997a] or 3-valued logics [McMillan 1999a; Bruns and Godefroid 1999; Sagiv et al. 1999 ] typically produce both correct positives and correct negatives, but may terminate with an unknown or approximate result. We refer the reader to Section 4.1 for an overview of additional related work.
In practice, abstraction based methods have been essential for verifying designs of industrial complexity. Currently, abstraction is typically a manual process, which requires considerable creativity and insight. In order for model checking to be used more widely in industry, automatic techniques are needed for generating abstractions.
This article describes a new counterexample-guided abstraction technique that extends the general framework of existential abstraction [Clarke et al. 1994] . The new methodology integrates symbolic model checking and existential abstraction into a unified framework. The method is efficient, fully automatic and based on symbolic algorithms. Starting with a relatively small skeletal representation of the system to be verified, we show how to compute increasingly precise abstract representations of the system. The key step is to extract information from false negatives due to over-approximation. Such artificial specification violations are witnessed by what we call "spurious counterexamples". Our method is complete for an important fragment of ACTL , precisely for the fragment of ACTL that admits counterexamples in the form of finite or infinite traces (i.e., finite traces followed by loops).
In this article, we aim to give a complete picture of the counterexample-guided refinement method, ranging from the theoretical foundations of the method to implementation-related issues and practical experiments involving a large Fujitsu IP core design.
1.1. TECHNICAL APPROACH. Throughout the article, we work in the framework of existential abstraction. Existential abstraction computes an over-approximation of the original model that simulates the original model. Thus, when a specification in the temporal logic ACTL is true in the abstract model, it will also be true in the concrete design. However, if the specification is false in the abstract model, the counterexample may be the result of some behavior in the approximation that is not present in the original model. When this happens, it is necessary to refine the abstraction so that the behavior that caused the erroneous counterexample is eliminated. This gives rise to a sequence of increasingly precise abstract models till the specification is either proved or disproved by a counterexample.
This article shows how this general counterexample-guided abstraction framework can be applied effectively to branching-time-symbolic model checking. The following list emphasizes the main technical contributions of the article:
(1) We describe a method to extract abstraction functions from the program text; in this method, the control flow predicates of the program are used to factor the state space into equivalence classes that are acting as abstract states. While reminiscent of predicate abstraction [Graf and Saïdi 1997] , this method fits into the existential abstraction framework proposed in Clarke et al. [1999b Clarke et al. [ , 1994 , and is used to obtain the initial abstract model. (2) For performance reasons, abstraction functions in the literature are often defined only for individual variables, and the abstraction function is obtained as a composition of individual abstraction functions. In contrast to this, we use abstraction functions that are defined on finite tuples of variables called variable clusters that are extracted from the program code. This approach allows one to express conditions involving several variables (such as x < y) in the abstraction function, and thus helps to keep the size of the abstract state space small. (3) We introduce symbolic algorithms to assert whether abstract counterexamples are spurious, or have corresponding concrete counterexamples. If a counterexample is spurious, we identify the shortest prefix of the abstract counterexample that does not correspond to an actual trace in the concrete model. The last abstract state in this prefix (the "failure state") needs to be split into less abstract states by refining the equivalence classes in such a way that the spurious counterexample is eliminated. Thus, a more refined abstraction function is obtained. (4) Note that there may be many ways of splitting the failure state; each determines a different refinement of the abstraction function. It is desirable to obtain the coarsest refinement which eliminates the counterexample because this corresponds to the smallest abstract model that is suitable for verification. We prove, however, that finding the coarsest refinement is NP-hard. Because of this, we use a symbolic polynomial-time refinement algorithm that gives a suboptimal but sufficiently good refinement of the abstraction function. The applicability of our heuristic algorithm is confirmed by our experiments.
Summarizing, our technique has a number of advantages:
-The technique is complete for an important fragment of the temporal logic ACTL . -The initial abstraction and the refinement steps are efficient and entirely automatic and all algorithms are symbolic.
-In comparison to methods like the localization reduction [Kurshan 1994 ], we distinguish more degrees of abstraction for each variable. Thus, the changes in the refinement are potentially finer in our approach. The refinement procedure is guaranteed to eliminate spurious counterexamples while keeping the state space of the abstract model small.
PRACTICAL EXPERIMENTS.
We have implemented a prototype tool aSMV based on NuSMV [Cimatti et al. 1998 ] and applied it to a number of benchmark designs. In addition we have used it to debug a large IP core being developed at Fujitsu [1996] . The design has about 350 symbolic variables that correspond to about 500 latches. Before using our methodology, we implemented the cone of influence [Clarke et al. 1999a, Page 193] reduction in NuSMV to enhance its ability to check large models. Neither our enhanced version of NuSMV nor the recent version of SMV developed by Yang [Yang et al. 1998 ] were able to verify the Fujitsu IP core design. However, by using our new technique, we were able to find a subtle error in the design. aSMV automatically abstracted 144 symbolic variables and verified the design using just three refinement steps.
1.3. RELATED WORK. Our method extends the existential abstraction framework developed by Clarke et al. [1994] . This framework will be outlined in Section 2. In our methodology, atomic formulas that describes the model are automatically extracted from the program. The atomic formulas are similar to the predicates used for abstraction by Graf and Saïdi [1997] . However, instead of using the atomic formulas to generate an abstract global transition system, we use them to construct an explicit abstraction function. The abstraction function preserves logical relationships among the atomic formulas instead of treating them as independent propositions. A more detailed comparison to predicate abstraction will be provided in Section 4.2.2.
Using counterexamples to refine abstract models has been investigated by a number of other researchers beginning with the localization reduction of Kurshan [1994] . He models a concurrent system as a composition of L-processes L 1 , . . . , L n (L-processes are described in detail in Kurshan [1994] ). The localization reduction is an iterative technique that starts with a small subset of relevant L-processes that are topologically close to the specification in the variable dependency graph. All other program variables are abstracted away with nondeterministic assignments. If the counterexample is found to be spurious, additional variables are added to eliminate the counterexample. The heuristic for selecting these variables also uses information from the variable dependency graph. Note that the localization reduction either leaves a variable unchanged or replaces it by a nondeterministic assignment. A similar approach has been described by Balarin in Balarin and Sangiovanni-Vincentelli [1993] . In our approach, the abstraction functions exploit logical relationships among variables appearing in atomic formulas that occur in the control structure of the program. Moreover, the way we use abstraction functions makes it possible to distinguish many degrees of abstraction for each variable. Therefore, in the refinement step only very small and local changes to the abstraction functions are necessary and the abstract model remains comparatively small.
Another refinement technique has recently been proposed by Lind-Nielsen and Andersen [1999] . Their model checker uses upper and lower approximations in order to handle entire CTL. Their approximation techniques enable them to avoid rechecking the entire model after each refinement step while guaranteeing completeness. As in Balarin and Sangiovanni-Vincentelli [1993] and Kurshan [1994] , the variable dependency graph is used both to obtain the initial abstraction and in the refinement process. Variable abstraction is also performed in a similar manner. Therefore, our abstraction-refinement methodology relates to their technique in essentially the same way as it relates to the classical localization reduction.
A number of other papers [Lee et al. 1996; Pardo 1997; Pardo and Hachtel 1998 ] have proposed abstraction-refinement techniques for CTL model checking. However, these papers do not use counterexamples to refine the abstraction. We believe that the methods described in these papers are orthogonal to our technique and may even be combined with our article in order to achieve better performance. A recent technique proposed by Govindaraju and Dill [1998] may be a starting point in this direction, since it also tries to identify the first spurious state in an abstract counterexample. It randomly chooses a concrete state corresponding to the first spurious state and tries to construct a real counterexample starting with the image of this state under the transition relation. The paper only talks about safety properties and path counterexamples. It does not describe how to check liveness properties with cyclic counterexamples. Furthermore, our method does not use random choice to extend the counterexample; instead it analyzes the cause of the spurious counterexample and uses this information to guide the refinement process. Another counterexample-guided refinement approach supported by good experimental results has been presented by Govindaraju and Dill [2000] . The ideas presented in this paper are similar at a high level, but their work is restricted to safety properties and uses overlapping projections as underlying approximation scheme. A hamming distance heuristic is used to obtain the registers of the design that are to be refined. In comparison to our work, we put specific emphasis on the initial abstraction by predicate abstraction, and allow for a more general class of specifications.
Many abstraction techniques can be viewed as applications of the abstract interpretation framework Cousot 1977, 1999; Sifakis 1983] . Given an abstract domain, abstract interpretation provides a general framework for automatically "interpreting" systems on an abstract domain. The classical abstract interpretation framework was used to prove safety properties, and does not consider temporal logic or model checking. Bjorner et al. [1997] use abstract interpretation to automatically generate invariants for infinite-state systems. Abstraction techniques for various fragments of CTL have been discussed in Dams et al. [1993 Dams et al. [ , 1997a . These abstraction techniques have been extended to the µ-calculus [Dams et al. 1997b; Loiseaux et al. 1995] .
Abstraction techniques for infinite state systems are crucial for successful verification [Abdulla et al. 1999; Bensalem et al. 1992; Lesens and Saïdi 1997; Manna et al. 1998 ]. In fact, Graf and Saïdi [1997] have proposed the above-mentioned predicate abstraction techniques to abstract an infinite state system into a finite state system. Later, a number of optimization techniques have been developed in Bensalem et al. [1998] , Das et al. 1999; Dill 2001. Saïdi and Shankar [1999] have integrated predicate abstraction into the PVS system, which could easily determine when to abstract and when to model check. Variants of predicate abstraction have been used in the Bandera Project [Dwyer et al. 2001] and the SLAM project [Ball et al. 2001 ].
Colón and Uribe [1998] have presented a way to generate finite-state abstractions using a decision procedure. Similar to predicate abstraction, their abstraction is generated using abstract Boolean variables. One difference between our approach and the predicate abstraction based approaches is that the latter tries to build an abstract model on-the-fly while traversing the reachable state sets. Our approach tries to build the abstract transition relation directly. Wolper and Lovinfosse [1989] have verified data independent systems using model checking. In a data independent system, the data values never affect the control flow of the computation. Therefore, the datapath can be abstracted away entirely. Van Aelten et al. [1992] have discussed a method for simplifying the verification of synchronous processors by abstracting away the data path. Abstracting away the datapath using uninterpreted function symbols is very useful for verifying pipeline systems [Berezin et al. 1998; Burch and Dill 1994; Jones et al. 1998 ]. A number of researchers have modeled or verified industrial hardware systems using abstraction techniques [Fura et al. 1993; Graf 1994; Ho et al. 1998; Hojati and Brayton 1995] . In many cases, their abstractions are generated manually and combined with theorem proving techniques [Rushby 1999; Rusu and Singerman 1999] . Dingel and Filkorn [1995] have used data abstraction and assume-guarantee reasoning combined with theorem proving techniques to verify infinite state systems. Recently, McMillan [1996b] has incorporated a new type of data abstraction, assume-guarantee reasoning and theorem proving techniques in his Cadence SMV system. 1.4. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARTICLE. This article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides definitions, terminology and a formal background on model checking. Section 3 reviews and adapts the existential abstraction framework. The core of the article is Section 4, which describes the new approach and the algorithms put forward in this article. The proofs of the complexity results are postponed to Section 5. This is followed by Sections 6 and 7 which concentrate on practical performance improvements, and experiments. Future research directions are discussed in Section 8.
Fundamentals of Model Checking
2.1. KRIPKE STRUCTURES AND TEMPORAL LOGIC. In model checking, the system to be verified is formally represented by a finite Kripke structure, a directed graph whose vertices are labeled by sets of atomic propositions. Vertices and edges are called states and transitions respectively. One or more states are considered to be initial states. Thus, a Kripke structure over a set of atomic propositions A is a tuple K = (S, R, L , I ) where S is the set of states, R ⊆ S 2 is the set of transitions, I ⊆ S is the nonempty set of initial states, and L : S → 2 A labels each state by a set of atomic propositions A. A path is an infinite sequence of states, CTL is a subfragment of CTL , where each path quantifier A or E is immediately followed by a temporal operator, for example, AF p is a CTL formula, but AFG p is not. Model checking algorithms are usually fixed point algorithms that exploit the fact that temporal formulas can be expressed by fixed point formulas. In practice, systems are described by programs in finite state languages such as SMV or VERILOG. These programs are then compiled into equivalent Kripke structures.
Example 2.2. In the verification system SMV, the state space S of a Kripke structure is given by the possible assignments to the system variables. Here, next(reset) := {0, 1} means that the value of reset is chosen nondeterministically. Such situations occur frequently when reset is controlled by the environment, or when the model of the system is too abstract to determine the values of reset. For details about the SMV input language, we refer the reader to McMillan [1993] .
The main practical problem in model checking is the so-called state explosion problem caused by the fact that the Kripke structure represents the state space of the system under investigation, and thus its size is potentially exponential in the size of the system description. Therefore, even for systems of relatively modest size, it is often impossible to compute their Kripke structures explicitly. In the rest of this article, we will focus on a combination of two techniques, symbolic model checking and abstraction which alleviate the state explosion problem.
SYMBOLIC MODEL CHECKING.
In symbolic model checking, the transition relation of the Kripke structure is not explicitly constructed, but instead a Boolean function is computed which represents the transition relation. Similarly, sets of states are also represented by Boolean functions. Then, fixed point characterizations of temporal operators are applied to the Boolean functions rather than to the Kripke structure. Since in many practical situations the space requirements for Boolean functions are exponentially smaller than for explicit representation, symbolic verification is able to alleviate the state explosion problem in these situations. These Boolean functions are represented as ordered binary decision diagrams (BDDs). A short description on BDDs can be found in Section A.
A symbolic model checking algorithm is an algorithm whose variables denote not single states, but sets of states that are represented by Boolean functions (usually as BDDs, see Clarke et al. [1999a, Chap. 5] ). Therefore, symbolic algorithms use only such operations on sets which can be translated into BDD operations. For example, union and intersection of sets correspond to disjunction and conjunction respectively. Binary Decision Diagrams have been a particularly useful data structure for representing Boolean functions; despite their relative succinctness they provide canonical representations of Boolean functions, and therefore expressions of the form S 1 = S 2 , which are important in fixed point computations, can be evaluated very efficiently.
Image computation is the task of computing for a given set S of states the set of states
Since all temporal operators can be expressed as a combination of fixed point computations and image computations, image computation is central to verification tasks. In contrast to the other operations, however, image computation is not a simple BDD operation, and therefore presents of the major bottlenecks in verification. Part of the reason for this, ironically, is the fact that it is in general not feasible to construct a single BDD for the transition relation R. Instead, R is represented as the conjunction of several BDDs [McMillan 1996] . In Section 3.1, we shall address the problem of computing an abstraction of R without actually computing R.
Practical experiments show that the performance of symbolic methods is highly unpredictable. This phenomenon can be partially explained by complexity theoretic results which state that BDD representation does not improve worst case complexity. In fact, it has been shown [Feigenbaum et al. 1999; Veith 1998a] that representing a decision problem in terms of exponentially smaller BDDs usually increases its worst case complexity exponentially. For example, the problem of deciding EF p (reachability) is complete for nondeterministic logspace-NL, while in BDD representation it becomes complete for PSPACE. Similar results can be shown for other Boolean formalisms and are closely tied to principal questions in structural complexity theory [Gottlob et al. 1999; Veith 1997 Veith , 1998b . (
(2) For each state s 1 such that (s, s 1 ) ∈ R, there exists a state s 1 with the property that (s , s 1 ) ∈ R and (s 1 , s 1 ) ∈ H .
We say that M simulates M (denoted by M M ) if there exists a simulation relation H such that for every initial state s 0 in M there exists an initial state s 0 in M for which (s 0 , s 0 ) ∈ H . It is easy to see that the simulation relation is a preorder on the set of Kripke structures. The following classic result is one of the cornerstones of the abstraction refinement framework [Clarke et al. 1994a . 
Abstraction
Intuitively speaking, existential abstraction amounts to partitioning the states of a Kripke structure into clusters, and treating the clusters as new abstract states (see Figure 1) .
Formally, an abstraction function h is described by a surjection h : S → S where S is the set of abstract states. The surjection h induces an equivalence relation ≡ h on the domain S in the following manner: let d, e be states in S, then
Since an abstraction can be represented either by a surjection h or by an equivalence relation ≡ h , we sometimes switch between these representations. When the context is clear, we often write ≡ instead of ≡ h . The abstract Kripke structure M = ( S, I , R, L) generated by the abstraction function h is defined as follows:
Sometimes we write
Next we introduce a condition for abstraction functions which guarantees that for a given specification, no false positives are possible on the abstract model. (Formally, this will be stated in Theorem 3.3 below.)
An abstraction function h is appropriate for a specification ϕ if for all atomic subformulas f of ϕ and for all states d and e in the domain S such that d ≡ h e it holds that d |= f ⇔ e |= f . If ϕ is understood from the context, we just say that h is appropriate. h is appropriate for a set F of formulas if h is appropriate for all f ∈ F. 
It is easy to see that M contains less information than M. Thus, model checking the structure M potentially leads to incorrect results. The following theorem shows that at least for ACTL , specifications which are correct for M are correct for M as well. 
PROOF. Choose the simulation relation H to be {(s, h(s)) | s ∈ S}.
Then the definition is trivially satisfied.
We conclude that in the existential abstraction framework presented here, there are no false positives: THEOREM 3.3. Let h be appropriate for the ACTL specification ϕ. Then M h |= ϕ implies M |= ϕ.
PROOF. Immediately from Theorem 2.3 and Lemma 3.2
On the other hand, the following example shows that if the abstract model invalidates an ACTL specification, the actual model may still satisfy the specification.
Example 3.4. Assume that for a US traffic light controller (see Figure 2) , we want to prove ψ = AG AF(state = red) using the abstraction function h(red) = red and h(green) = h(yellow) = go. It is easy to see that M |= ψ while M |= ψ. There exists an infinite abstract trace red, go, go, . . . that invalidates the specification.
If an abstract counterexample does not correspond to some concrete counterexample, we call it spurious. For example, red, go, go, . . . in the above example is a spurious counterexample.
Let us consider the situation outlined in Figure 3 . We see that the abstract path does not have a corresponding concrete path. Whichever concrete path we follow, we will end up in state D, from which we cannot go any further. Therefore, D is called a deadend state. On the other hand, the bad state is state B, because it made us believe that there is an outgoing transition. In addition, there is the set of irrelevant states I that are neither deadend nor bad, and it is immaterial whether states in I are combined with D or B. To eliminate the spurious path, the abstraction has to be refined as indicated by the thick line.
3.1. APPROXIMATION FOR EXISTENTIAL ABSTRACTION. As argued above, it is usually computationally too expensive to compute existential abstraction directly [Long 1993 Remark 3.6. As the proof shows, approximation is much simpler than existential abstraction, because it does not affect the set of states. By approximating the set of transitions from above, we trade complexity against more spurious behavior.
Since is a preorder, M M h M in accordance with Theorem 3.3 and Theorem 3.5. Clarke et al. [1994] define a practical transformation T called early approximation that applies the existential abstraction operation directly to variables at the innermost level of the formula. This transformation generates a new structurẽ M T as follows. Assume that R = R 1 ∧· · ·∧ R n where each R i defines the transition relation for a single variable. Then, we apply abstraction to each R i separately, that is,
and analogously for I . Finally,M T is given by (S h , T (I ), T (R), L h ). As a simple example, consider a system M, which is a synchronous composition of two systems M 1 and M 2 , or in other words M = M 1 M 2 . Both M 1 and M 2 define the transition of one variable. In this case,M T is equal to (M 1 ) h (M 2 ) h . Note that the existential abstraction operation is applied to each process individually. Since T is applied at the innermost level, abstraction can be performed before building the BDDs for the transition relation. This abstraction technique is usually fast and easy to implement. However, it has potential limitations in checking certain properties. SinceM T is a coarse abstraction, there exist many properties that cannot be checked onM T but can still be verified using a finer approximation. The following small example will highlight some of these problems. The traffic light example is illustrated in Figure 4 . First, two Kripke structures M t and M c are constructed from the transition blocks.
1 The Kripke structure for the system is obtained by composing M t and M c , yielding the Kripke structure M t M c .
The safety property we want to prove is that when the traffic light is red, the automobile should not be driving. This can be written in ACTL as follows:
It is easy to see that the property ϕ is true over M t M c .
Let us consider an abstraction function abs which maps the values g and d to w (such as in "walk"). If we apply this abstraction after composing M t and M c , the state (r, d) remains unreachable, and the property ϕ still holds. If however, we use the transformation T , which applies abstraction before we compose M t and M c , property ϕ does not hold as (r, d) is reachable. We see that when we first abstract the individual components and then compose we may introduce too many spurious behaviors.
It is desirable to obtain an approximation structureM which is more precise than the structureM T obtained by the technique proposed in Clarke et al. [1994] . All the transitions in the abstract structure M h are included in bothM andM T . Note that the state sets of M h ,M andM T are the same and M M h M T . In summary, M h is intended to be built but is computationally expensive.M T is easy to build but extra behaviors are added into the structure. Our aim is to build a modelM which is computationally easier but a more refined approximation of M h thanM T , that is,
Counterexample-Guided Abstraction Refinement
4.1. OVERVIEW. For a program P and an ACTL formula ϕ, our goal is to check whether the Kripke structure M corresponding to P satisfies ϕ. Our methodology consists of the following steps:
(1) Generate the initial abstraction. We generate an initial abstraction h by examining the transition blocks corresponding to the variables of the program. We consider the conditions used in the case statements and construct variable clusters for variables which interfere with each other via these conditions. Details can be found in Section 4.2.2. (2) Model-check the abstract structure. Let M be the abstract Kripke structure corresponding to the abstraction h. We check whether M |= ϕ. If the check is affirmative, then we can conclude that M |= ϕ (see Theorem 3.3). Suppose the check reveals that there is a counterexample T . We ascertain whether T is an actual counterexample, that is, a counterexample in the unabstracted structure M. Since the model is finite, this can be achieved by "simulating" the counterexample on the actual model. If T turns out to be an actual counterexample, we report it to the user; otherwise, T is a spurious counterexample, and we proceed to step (3). (3) Refine the abstraction. We refine the abstraction function h by partitioning a single equivalence class of ≡ so that after the refinement the abstract structure M corresponding to the refined abstraction function does not admit the spurious counterexample T . We will discuss partitioning algorithms for this purpose in Section 4.4. After refining the abstraction function, we return to step (2).
GENERATING THE INITIAL ABSTRACTION
4.2.1. Concurrent Programs. We describe a simple syntactic framework to formalize guarded concurrent programs. Common hardware description languages like Verilog and VHDL can easily be compiled into this language. With each program P we associate an ACTL specification ϕ whose atomic formulas are constructed from expressions and relation symbols as above. For each transition block B i let Atoms(B i ) be the set of atomic formulas that appear in the conditions. Let Atoms(ϕ) be the set of atomic formulas appearing in the specification ϕ. Atoms(P) is the set of atomic formulas that appear in the specification or in the conditions of the transition blocks.
Each program P naturally corresponds to a labeled Kripke structure M = (S, I, R, L), where S = D is the set of states, I ⊆ S is a set of initial states, R ⊆ S × S is a transition relation, and L: S → 2 Atoms(P) is a labelling given by
Translating a program into a Kripke structure is straightforward and will not be described here (see Clarke et al. [1999a] ) We use both D and S to refer to the set of states depending on the context.
Initial Abstraction Function.
The rationale behind the abstraction function we shall define is that we identify two states if they can be distinguished neither by (a) atomic subformulas of the specifications, nor by (b) control flow conditions in the program.
Intuitively, clause (a) will guarantee that the abstraction function is appropriate for the specification, and clause (b) guarantees that the abstraction function does not destroy the branching structure of the program. Thus, the initial abstraction represents a "control flow skeleton" of the original system. Formally, we define the initial abstraction function as a special case of a slightly more general definition. The initial abstraction function is constructed in accordance with the intuition explained above: Definition 4.3. Let P be a program and ϕ be an ACTL specification. Then the initial abstraction function init is given by h Atoms(P) .
Combining this with the definition given in Section 3, we obtain an initial abstraction function init satisfying sign decision rather than a technical necessity. If the abstract space obtained in this way is too large, it is possible to replace h Atoms(P) by some h X where X is a different superset of Atoms(ϕ). In particular, X may be derived in accordance with a different strategy than the one mentioned in clause (b) above. It is even possible to use not only atomic formulas as in Atoms(P), but also more complicated conditions involving, say, first order logic. Since we work in finite and typically small domains, such an extension is feasible. (ii) Technically, the initial abstraction function described here can be also described as a predicate abstraction similar to Graf and Saïdi [1997] in which the abstract space contains tuples of Boolean variables (b 1 , . . . , b N ) where
Predicate abstraction for software, however, typically uses fewer predicates because the value of each b i needs to be determined by a decision procedure that can have very high complexity. Moreover, the symbolic algorithms presented later do not fit well into the predicate abstraction framework.
Fine Structure of Abstraction Functions.
As Example 2.2 shows, the set of states S of a Kripke structure is typically obtained as the product D 1 × · · · × D n of smaller domains. A simple way to define abstraction functions is by surjections
In this case, we write h = (h 1 , . . . , h n ), and say that h is a composite abstraction function with components h 1 , . . . , h n .
The equivalence relations ≡ i corresponding to the components h i relate to the equivalence relation ≡ h over the entire domain S = D 1 × · · · × D n in the obvious manner:
Remark 4.6. Previous work on existential abstraction [Clarke et al. 1994] It is easy to see however that the initial abstraction function init defined in Section 4.2.2 may in principle exhaust all combinatorial possibilities. Thus, the initial abstraction function is more general than in Clarke et al. [1994] . As argued above, it cannot always be represented as a composite abstraction function, and may therefore become intractable in practice.
It is therefore important to represent the abstraction functions we use as composite abstraction functions to the extent this is possible. To this end, we define the initial abstraction function in a different way based on the syntactic structure of the program, and show then in Theorem 4.8 that this composite abstraction is equivalent to the abstraction function init defined in Section 4. Given an atomic formula f , let var( f ) be the set of variables appearing in f , e.g., var(x = y) is {x, y}. Given a set of atomic formulas U , var(U ) equals f ∈U var( f ). In general, for any syntactic entity X , var(X ) will be the set of variables appearing in X . We say that two atomic formulas f 1 and f 2 interfere iff var( f 1 ) ∩ var( f 2 ) = ∅. Let ≡ I be the equivalence relation on Atoms(P) that is the reflexive, transitive closure of the interference relation. The equivalence class of an atomic formula f ∈ Atoms(P) is called the formula cluster of f and is denoted by [ f ] . Let f 1 and f 2 be two atomic formulas.
In other words, a variable v i cannot appear in formulas that belong to two different formula clusters. Moreover, the formula clusters induce an equivalence relation ≡ V on the set of variables V in the following way: 
In other words, two values are in the same equivalence class if they cannot be distinguished by atomic formulas appearing in the formula cluster FC i . The following example illustrates how we construct the abstraction function h. Example 4.7. Consider the program P with three variables x, y ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and reset ∈ {TRUE, FALSE} shown in Example 2.2. The set of atomic formulas is Atoms(P) = {(reset = TRUE), (x = y), (x < y), (y = 2)}. There are two formula clusters, FC 1 = {(x = y), (x < y), (y = 2)} and FC 2 = {(reset = TRUE)}. The corresponding variable clusters are {x, y} and {reset}, respectively. Consider the formula cluster FC 1 . Values (0, 0) and (1, 1) are in the same equivalence class because for all the atomic formulas f in the formula cluster FC 1 it holds that (0, 0) |= f iff (1, 1) |= f . It can be shown that the domain {0, 1, 2} × {0, 1, 2} is partitioned into a total of five equivalence classes by this criterion. We denote these classes by the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and list them below: 0 = {(0, 0), (1, 1)}, 1 = {(0, 1)}, 2 = {(0, 2), (1, 2)}, 3 = {(1, 0), (2, 0), (2, 1)}, 4 = {(2, 2)}.
The domain {TRUE, FALSE} has two equivalence classes-one containing FALSE and the other TRUE. Therefore, we define two abstraction functions h 1 : {0, 1, 2} 2 → {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and h 2 : {TRUE, FALSE} → {TRUE, FALSE}. The first function h 1 is given by h 1 (0, 0) = h 1 (1, 1) = 0, h 1 (0, 1) = 1, h 1 (0, 2) = h 1 (1, 2) = 2, h 1 (1, 0) = h 1 (2, 0) = h 1 (2, 1) = 3, h 1 (2, 2) = 4. The second function h 2 is just the identity function, that is, h 2 (reset) = reset.
PROOF. It is sufficient to show that ≡ h and ≡ init are equivalent. Let π V C i be the projection function which maps a tuple d ∈ D to the subtuple corresponding to VC i . For each f ∈ FC i it holds that d |= f iff π VC i (d) |= f because by definition all f ∈ FC i depend only on elements of VC i . Since the formula clusters of FC i form a partition of Atoms(P), we obtain
by combining the respective definitions.
Remark 4.9. Throughout this article, we will use composite abstraction functions based on variable clusters. For actual hardware designs, our experiments have shown that this approach optimally combines feasibility and expressiveness. Some comments are in order at this point:
(i) The variable clusters are an artifact of the way we chose to define Atoms(P).
By virtue of Proposition 4.2, we may construct variable clusters based on supersets of Atoms(ϕ) different from Atoms(P). (ii) If a variable cluster becomes too big, we may choose to remove formulas from Atoms(P) \ Atoms(ϕ) in order to split variable clusters. For instance, if we have a variable cluster {u, v, w, x} obtained from control atoms u = v, v < w, w = x, we may choose to disregard v < w in order to obtain two variable clusters {u, v}, {w, x}. (iii) It is possible to represent this problem by a hypergraph whose vertices are the variables V , and whose edges are given by {var( f )| f ∈ Atoms(P)}, that is, by the variables occurring in the atomic formulas we consider. (In case of binary relation symbols, the hypergraph will be a graph.) In this setting, the problem of finding suitable atoms to split variable clusters amounts to finding small cuts in the hypergraph.
MODEL CHECKING THE ABSTRACT MODEL.
Given an ACTL specification ϕ, an abstraction function h (assume that h is appropriate for ϕ), and a program P with a finite set of variables V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }, let M be the abstract Kripke structure corresponding to the abstraction function h. We use standard symbolic model checking procedures to determine whether M satisfies the specification ϕ. If it does, then by Theorem 3.3 we can conclude that the original Kripke structure also satisfies ϕ. Otherwise, assume that the model checker produces a counterexample T corresponding to the abstract model M. In the rest of this section, we focus on counterexamples which are either (finite) paths or loops.
Identification of Spurious Path
Counterexamples. First, we tackle the case when the counterexample T is a path s 1 , . . . , s n . Given an abstract state s, the set of concrete states s such that h(s) = s is denoted by h −1 ( s), that is, h −1 ( s) = {s|h(s) = s}. We extend h −1 to sequences in the following way: h −1 ( T ) is the set of concrete paths given by the following expression
We will occasionally write h −1 path to emphasize the fact that h −1 is applied to a sequence. Next, we give a symbolic algorithm to compute h −1 ( T ). Let S 1 = h −1 ( s 1 ) ∩ I and R be the transition relation corresponding to the unabstracted Kripke structure M. For 1 < i ≤ n, we define S i in the following manner:
is the forward image of S i−1 with respect to the transition relation R. The sequence of sets S i is computed symbolically using OBDDs and the standard image computation algorithm. The following lemma establishes the correctness of this procedure. (iii) For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, S i = ∅.
PROOF (i) → (ii). Assume that T corresponds to a concrete counterexample T = s 1 , . . . , s n . From the definition of T , h(s i ) = s i and s
Since T is a trace in the concrete model, it has to satisfy the transition relation and start from initial state, that is, R(s i , s i+1 ) and s 1 ∈ I . From the definition of 
Therefore, the trace s 1 , . . . , s n that we have constructed satisfies the definition of h −1 ( T ). Thus,
Suppose that condition (iii) of Lemma 4.10 is violated, and let i be the largest index such that S i = ∅. Then s i is called the failure state of the spurious counterexample T .
Example 4.11. Consider a program with only one variable with domain D = {1, . . . , 12}. Assume that the abstraction function h maps x ∈ D to (x − 1)/3 +1. There are four abstract states corresponding to the equivalence classes {1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}, {7, 8, 9}, and {10, 11, 12}. We call these abstract states 1, 2, 3, and 4. The transitions between states in the concrete model are indicated by the arrows in Figure 6 ; small dots denote nonreachable states. Suppose that we obtain an abstract counterexample T = 1, 2, 3, 4 . It is easy to see that T is spurious. Using the terminology of Lemma 4.10, we have S 1 = {1, 2, 3}, S 2 = {4, 5, 6}, S 3 = {9}, and S 4 = ∅. Notice that Img(S 3 , R) and therefore S 4 are both empty. Thus, s 3 is the failure state.
It follows from Lemma 4.10 that if h −1 ( T ) is empty (i.e., if the counterexample T is spurious), then there exists a minimal i (2 ≤ i ≤ n) such that S i = ∅. The symbolic Algorithm SplitPATH in Figure 7 computes this number and the set of states S i−1 ; the states in S i−1 are called dead-end states. After the detection of the dead-end states, we proceed to the refinement step (see Section 4.4). On the other hand, if the conditions stated in Lemma 4.10 are true, then SplitPATH will report a "real" counterexample and we can stop. s n . Since this case is more complicated than the path counterexamples, we first present an example in which some of the typical situations occur.
Example 4.12. We consider a loop s 1 s 2 , s 3 ω as shown in Figure 8 . In order to find out if the abstract loop corresponds to concrete loops, we unwind the counterexample as demonstrated in the figure. There are two situations where cycles occur. In the figure, for each of these situations, an example cycle (the first one occurring) is indicated by a fat dashed arrow. We make the following important observations: We conclude from the example that a naive algorithm may have exponential time complexity due to an exponential number of loop unwindings. The following theorem however shows that a polynomial number of unwindings is sufficient. (In Section 6, we indicate further practical improvements.) Let min be the minimum size of all abstract states in the loop, that is, min = min i+1≤ j≤n |h −1 ( s j )|. 
Recall that R is the transition relation of the Kripke structure. By definition, the elements of h −1 ( T unwind ) are all the finite R-paths P of the form
for which the following two properties hold:
Each such path P has length L := i + (min + 1) × (n − i), and we can equivalently write P in the form
with the properties
, and
Recall that min was defined to be the size of the smallest abstract state in the loop, that is, min{|h 
CLAIM. There exists a state that appears at least twice in P.

PROOF OF CLAIM. Suppose P is in form ( * ). Consider the states b
contains only min elements, and thus there must be at least one repetition in the sequence b
. Therefore, there exists a repetition in the finite R-path P, and the claim is proved.
Let us now write P in form ( * * ), that is, We conclude that loop counterexamples can be reduced to path counterexamples. In Figure 9 , we describe the algorithm SplitLOOP which is an extension of SplitPATH. In the algorithm, T unwind is computed by the subprogram unwind. The subprogram LoopIndex( j) computes the index of the abstract state at position j in the unwound counterexample T unwind , that is, for j ≤ n, LoopIndex outputs j, and for j > n, LoopIndex outputs
If the abstract counterexample is spurious, then the algorithm SplitLOOP outputs a set S prev and indices k, p, such that the following conditions hold (see Figure 10 ):
(1) The states in S prev correspond to the abstract state s p , that is, S prev ⊆ h −1 ( s p ).
(2) All states in S prev are reachable from h −1 ( s 1 ) ∩ I . (3) k is the successor index of p within the loop, that is, if p = n then k = i + 1, and otherwise k = p + 1. (4) There is no transition from a state in S prev to h
5) Therefore, s p is the failure state of the loop counterexample.
Thus, the final situation encountered is indeed very similar to the case of path counterexamples. Note that the nontrivial feature of the algorithm SplitLOOP is the fact that only min unwindings of the loop are necessary.
Remark 4.14. While the procedure of this section gives an exact picture of the situation to be solved, more efficient algorithms are used in our practical implementation (see Section 6).
4.4. REFINING THE ABSTRACTION. In this section, we explain how to refine an abstraction to eliminate the spurious counterexample. Recall the discussion concerning Figure 3 in Section 3 where we identified deadend states, bad states, and irrelevant states.
First, we will consider the case when the counterexample T = s 1 , . . . , s n is a path. Let us return to a previous example for a closer investigation of failure states.
Example 4.15. Recall that in the spurious counterexample of Figure 6 , the abstract state 3 was the failure state. There are three types of concrete states in the failure state 3:
(i) The dead-end state 9 is reachable, but there are no outgoing transitions to the next state in the counterexample. (ii) The bad state 7 is not reachable but outgoing transitions cause the spurious counterexample. The spurious counterexamples is caused by the bad state. (iii) The irrelevant state 8 is neither dead-end nor bad.
The goal of the refinement methodology described in this section is to refine h so that the dead-end states and bad states do not correspond to the the same abstract state. Then the spurious counterexample will be eliminated.
If T does not correspond to a real counterexample, by Lemma 4.10 (iii) there always exists a set S i of dead-end states, that is,
and S i is reachable from initial state set h −1 ( s 1 ) ∩ I . Moreover, the set S i of dead-end states can be obtained as the output S prev of SplitPATH. Since there is a transition from s i to s i+1 in the abstract model, there is at least one transition from a bad state in h −1 ( s i ) to a state in h −1 ( s i+1 ) even though there is no transition from S i to h −1 ( s i+1 ), and thus the set of bad states is not empty. We partition h −1 ( s i ) into three subsets S D , S B , and S I as follows:
Intuitively, S D denotes the set of dead-end states, that is, states in h −1 ( s i ) that are reachable from initial states. S B denotes the set of bad states, that is, those states in h −1 ( s i ) that are not reachable from initial states, but have at least one transition to some state in h −1 ( s i+1 ). The set S B cannot be empty since we know that there is a transition from h −1 ( s i ) to h −1 ( s i+1 ). S I denotes the set of irrelevant states, that is, states that are not reachable from initial states, and do not have a transition to a state in h −1 ( s i+1 ). Since S B is not empty, there is a spurious transition s i → s i+1 . This causes the spurious counterexample T . Hence in order to refine the abstraction h so that the new model does not allow T , we need a refined abstraction function which separates the two sets S D and S B , that is, we need an abstraction function, in which no abstract state simultaneously contains states from S D and from S B .
It is natural to describe the needed refinement in terms of equivalence relations: Recall that h −1 ( s i ) is an equivalence class of ≡ which has the form E 1 × · · · × E m , where each E i is an equivalence class of ≡ i . Thus, the refinement ≡ of ≡ is obtained by partitioning the equivalence classes E j into subclasses, which amounts to refining the equivalence relations ≡ j . Formally, we say that ≡ is a refinement of ≡ if for all j ∈ [1, m] it holds that ≡ j ⊆≡ j , and write ≡ ⊆≡ in this case. We assume that all refining relations are supersets of the equality relation = given by {(s, s) | s ∈ S}. The size of the refinement is the number of new equivalence classes. Ideally, we would like to find the coarsest refinement that separates the two sets, that is, the separating refinement with the smallest size.
Example 4.16. Assume that we have two variables v 1 , v 2 . The failure state corresponds to one equivalence class E 1 × E 2 , where E 1 = {3, 4, 5} and E 2 = {7, 8, 9}. In Figure 11 , dead-end states S D are denoted by 0, bad states S B by 1, and irrelevant states by x.
Let us consider two possible partitions of E 1 × E 2 :
-Case (a) : {(3, 4), (5)} × {(7), (8), (9)} (6 classes) -Case (b) : {(3), (4, 5)} × {(7, 9), (8)} (4 classes)
Clearly, case (b) generates a coarser refinement than case (a). It can be easily checked that no other refinement is coarser than (b).
In general, the problem of finding the coarsest refinement problem is computationally intractable. The proof of the following result is given in Section 5.
THEOREM 4.17. The problem of finding the coarsest refinement is NP-hard.
We therefore need to obtain a good heuristics for abstraction refinement. Inspecting the proof of Theorem 4.17, we see that the hardness proof heavily exploits the existence of irrelevant states. We will therefore first consider the case when S I is empty.
In this case, we show that there exists a unique coarsest refinement which can be computed in polynomial time by a symbolic algorithm. Consider the algorithm PolyRefine of Figure 12 (d 1 , . . . , d m ) . Given a set X ⊆ S, an index j ∈ [1, m], and an element a ∈ D j , the projection set proj(X, j, a) is given by 
It is easy to see that s 1 ≡ s 2 because a ≡ j b by assumption, and d i ≡ i d i for all i. We conclude that ≡ does not separate S D and S B .
Next we show that indeed the necessary condition is also sufficient to obtain a refinement. 
PROOF. The algorithm PolyRefine computes
Using the last identity of this equation, reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity of each ≡ j can be easily observed. Hence ≡ is an equivalence relation. Now, we show that ≡ is a correct refinement, that is, that for all dead-end states of states constructed as follows:
. . .
All x i are concrete states corresponding to the failure state, because by as- 
Analogously, let us now consider any two neighboring states x i , x i+1 in this sequence. Then the states x i and x i+1 only differ in their ith component. As above, we conclude that proj(S D , i, b i ) = proj(S D , i, d i ), and therefore Let us now return to the general case where S I is not empty. Since in accordance with Theorem 4.13, the algorithm SplitLOOP for loop counterexamples works analogously to SplitPATH, the refinement procedure for spurious loop counterexamples works analogously, that is, it uses SplitLOOP to identify the failure state, and PolyRefine to obtain a heuristic refinement.
By this chain of equivalences it follows that
Our refinement procedure continues to refine the abstraction function by partitioning equivalence classes until a real counterexample is found, or the ACTL property is verified. The partitioning procedure is guaranteed to terminate since each equivalence class must contain at least one element. Thus, our method is complete. THEOREM 4.24. Given a model M and an ACTL specification ϕ whose counterexample is either path or loop, our algorithm will find a model M such that M |= ϕ ⇔ M |= ϕ.
Complexity of Optimal Abstraction Refinement
Recall that, in Figure 11 , we have visualized the special case of two variables and two equivalence relations in terms of matrices. In order to formally capture this visualization, let us define the Matrix Squeezing problem.
Definition 5.1. Matrix Squeezing. Given a finite matrix with entries 0, 1, x and a constant , is it possible to construct a matrix with ≤ entries by iterating the following operations:
(1) Merging two compatible rows.
(2) Merging two compatible columns.
Two columns are compatible, if there is no position, where one column contains 1 and the other column contains 0. All other combinations are allowed, that is, x does not affect compatibility. Merging two compatible columns means replacing the columns by a new one which contains 1 at those positions where at least one of the two columns contained 1, and 0 at those positions, where at least one of the two columns contained 0. For rows, the definitions are analogous.
Since this is a special case of the refinement problem, it is sufficient to show NP-hardness for Matrix Squeezing. Then it follows that the refinement problem is NP-hard, too, and thus Theorem 4.17 is proved.
As mentioned Matrix Squeezing is easy to visualize: If we imagine the symbol x to be transparent, then merging two columns can be thought of as putting the two (transparent) columns on top of each other. Column Squeezing is a variant of Matrix Squeezing, where only columns can be merged:
Definition 5.2. Column Squeezing. Given a finite matrix with entries 0, 1, x and a constant , is it possible to construct a matrix with ≤ columns by iterated merging of columns?
The proof will be by reduction from problem GT15 in Garey and Johnson [1979] : PROOF. Membership is trivial. Let us consider hardness. We reduce Partition Into Cliques to Column Squeezing. Given a graph (V, E) and a number K , we have to construct a matrix M and a number such that M can be squeezed to size ≤ iff (V, E) can be partitioned in ≤ K cliques.
We construct a (|V |, |V |) matrix (a i, j ) which is very similar to the adjacency matrix of (V, E):
Assume without loss of generality that V = {1, . . . , n}. Then it is not hard to see that for all i, j ∈ V , columns i and j are compatible iff (i, j) ∈ E, since by construction we included 0 in the matrix only to forbid merging of columns. Thus, (V, E) can be partitioned into ≤ K cliques, iff the columns of (a i, j ) can be merged into ≤ K columns. Setting = K concludes the proof. An easy construction to obtain this is to concatenate the rows of M with the binary encodings of the numbers 0, . . . , m − 1 over alphabet {0, 1}, such that the ith row is concatenated with the binary encoding of the number i − 1. Since any two different binary encodings are distinguished by at least one position, no two rows are compatible. In addition, we add an n + 1st row that contains 1 on positions in the original columns, and 0 on positions in the new columns. Thus, in matrices of the form B(M), only columns that already appeared in M (with an additional 0 symbol below) can be compatible.
It remains to determine . We set := ( + |bin(m − 1)|) × (n + 1). The term |bin(m − 1)| takes into account that we have added |bin(m − 1)| columns, and the factor (n + 1) takes into account that is counting columns, while is counting matrix entries.
Example 5.7. Figure 13 demonstrates how a graph instance is reduced to a matrix instance. Note for example that {1, 2, 3} is a clique in the graph, and therefore, the columns 1, 2, 3 of the Column Squeezing problem are compatible. In the Matrix Squeezing Instance, Columns 7, 8, 9 enforce that no rows can be merged. Row 7 guarantees that columns 7, 8, 9 can not be merged with columns 1, . . . , 6 or with themselves.
Remark 5.8. It is highly unlikely that there are PTIME approximation algorithms for computing the size of an optimal abstraction refinement. [Bellare et al. 2003 ] have shown that no polynomial time algorithm can approximate the chromatic number of a graph (V, E) within |V | 1/7− for any > 0 unless P = NP. It is easy to see that there is a metric reduction between the chromatic number problem and the problem of computing the size of an optimal abstraction refinement for two variable clusters. (Note that Partition Into Cliques is reducible to Graph Coloring by a trivial reduction which maps a graph to its complement.) Thus, nonapproximability of optimal abstraction refinement follows. Under the assumption that coRP is different from RP, an even stronger nonapproximability result for computing chromatic number has been shown by Feige and Kilian [1996] . A rigorous proof of these observations exceeds the scope of this article and is omitted. Since there are no approximation algorithms, we have to rely on heuristics to solve the abstraction refinement problem. 
Performance Improvements
The symbolic methods described in Section 4.2.3 can be directly implemented using BDDs. Our implementation uses additional heuristics that are outlined in this section. Two-phase Refinement Algorithms. Consider the spurious loop counterexample T = 1, 2 ω of Figure 14 . Although T is spurious, the concrete states involved in the example contain an infinite path 1, 1, . . . which is a potential counterexample. Since we know that our method is complete, such cases could be ignored. Due to practical performance considerations, however, we came to the conclusion that the relatively small effort to detect additional counterexamples is justified as a valuable heuristic. For a general loop counterexample T = s 1 , . . . , s i s i+1 , . . . , s n ω , we therefore proceed in two phases:
(i) We restrict the model to the state space S local := ( 1≤i≤n h −1 ( s i )) of the counterexample and use the standard fixpoint computation for temporal formulas (see, e.g., Clarke et al. [1999a] ) to check the property on the Kripke structure restricted to S local . If a concrete counterexample is found, then the algorithm terminates.
(ii) If no counterexample is found, we use SplitLOOP and PolyRefine to compute a refinement as described above.
This two-phase algorithm is slightly slower than the original one if we do not find a concrete counterexample; in many cases, however, it can speed up the search for a concrete counterexample. An analogous two phase approach is used for finite path counterexamples.
Approximation. Recall from the discussion on early approximation in Section 3.1 that the transition relation R of a large model is often partitioned [Clarke et al. 1999a ] into transition relations R 1 , . . . , R n , where each R i is the transition relation for a single variable in the system. The abstract transition relation is overapproximated by the relation
yielding a Kripke structureM T . The transitions in the set difference T − R h are called virtual transitions.
As illustrated by Example 3.7, the disadvantage of early approximation is that the virtual transitions inM T may obscure important behavior, cf. also Clarke et al. [1999] .
Recall from Section 4.2.3 that in our approach the composite abstraction function is defined for each variable cluster independently. Therefore, we can use a heuristic to determine for each variable cluster VC i , if early approximation should be applied or if the abstraction function should be applied in an exact manner. Our method has the advantage that it balances over-approximation and memory usage. Moreover, the overall method presented in our paper remains complete with this approximation.
Assume 
Our method remains complete, because during the symbolic simulation of the counterexample the algorithms SplitPATH and SplitLOOP treat both forms of over-approximations, that is, virtual transitions and spurious transitions, in the same way.
Abstractions for Distant Variables. In addition to the methods of Section 4.2.2, we completely abstract away variables whose distance from the specification in the variable dependency graph is greater than a user-defined constant. Note that the variable dependency graph is also used for this purpose in the localization reduction [Balarin and Sangiovanni-Vincentelli 1993; Kurshan 1994; Lind-Nielsen and Andersen 1999] in a similar way. However, the refinement process of the localization reduction [Kurshan 1994 ] can only turn a completely abstracted variable into a completely unabstracted variable, while our method uses intermediate abstraction functions.
A user-defined integer constant far determines which variables are close to the specification ϕ. The set NEAR of near variables contains those variables whose distance from the specification in the dependency graph is at most far, and FAR = var(P) − NEAR is the set of far variables. For variable clusters without far variables, the abstraction function remains unchanged. For variable clusters with far variables, their far variables are completely abstracted away, and their near variables remain unabstracted. Note that the initial abstraction for variable clusters with far variables looks similar as in the localization reduction.
Experimental Results
We have implemented our methodology in NuSMV [Cimatti et al. 1998 ] which uses the CUDD package [Somenzi 2003 ] for symbolic representation. We performed two sets of experiments. One set includes four benchmark designs and three industrial designs from Synopsys. The other was performed on an industrial design of a multimedia processor from Fujitsu [1996] . All the experiments were carried out on a 200 MHz PentiumPro PC with 1 GB RAM memory using Linux. 7.1. EXPERIMENTS ON BENCHMARK CIRCUITS. The first benchmark set includes four publicly available designs and three industrial designs. Properties of these designs are described in Table I . In the table, the second column (#Var) shows the number of symbolic variables in the designs, while the third column (#Reg) shows the corresponding number of the Boolean variables. For example, a symbolic variable whose domains has size eight corresponds to three Boolean variables. Therefore, the number of Boolean variables is always larger or equal to the number of symbolic variables. Overall, 37 specifications are considered in this benchmark. The results for these designs are listed in Table II . Note that average time and space usage per design are reported in this table. In the table, the performance for an enhanced version of NuSMV with cone of influence reduction (NuSMV + COI) and our implementation (NuSMV + ABS) are compared. The columns #COI and #ABS contain the number of symbolic variables which have been abstracted using the cone of influence reduction (#COI), and our initial abstraction (#ABS). The column "Time" denotes the accumulated running time to verify all #Prop properties of the design. |TR| denotes the maximum number of BDD nodes used for building the transition relation. |MC| denotes the maximum number of additional BDD nodes used during the verification of the properties. Thus, |TR| + |MC| is the maximum BDD size during the total model checking process. For the larger examples, we use partitioned transition relations by setting the BDD size limit to 10000.
We also report the relative time and space difference between our approach and traditional cone of influence reduction in Figure 15 and Figure 16 . In the figures, the x axis corresponds to the number of properties and y axis corresponds to the relative time and space difference respectively (Time(COI)/Time(Abs) and Space(COI)/Space(Abs)). Although our approach uses less than 50% more memory than the traditional cone of influence reduction to build the abstract transition relation, it requires one order of magnitude of memory less during model checking. This is an important achievement since the model checking process is the most difficult task in verifying large designs. More significant improvement is further demonstrated by the Fujitsu IP core design. It is one of the characteristics of a system-on-chip that the design contains bus bridges, because the components of the system may have different interface protocols or different frequencies of operation. Bus bridges are used to construct a bus hierarchy according to the locality of transactions. MM-ASIC consists of the following five bus bridges.
-"BB-I" and "BB-H". These separate Bus-M from Bus-H and Bus-I, since the bus frequency of Bus-M is different from that of Bus-H and Bus-I. -"BB-S". This separates the transactions between GDC and SDRAM from those between MMA and host CPU, since they are major transactions in MM-ASIC. -"BB-R". This resolves the difference between the protocols of Bus-R and Bus-S. -"Bus-M". This separates Bus-M from the local bus of MMA.
The RTL implementation of MM-ASIC is described in Verilog-HDL. The total number of lines of code is about 61,500. The verification is targeted to verify the correctness of the bus transactions. Therefore, three operational units, peripheral I/Os, MMA, and GDC are omitted. After this elimination of the units, the number of registers is reduced to about 4000. Fujitsu engineers then abstracted away the data path which is not useful for our verification task. The final description contains about 500 latches. Figure 18 shows some control signals and controllers within bus bridges. BB-H, BB-I and BB-M contains a DMA controller "DMAC" which controls a DMA transfer between SDRAM and a component, such as an external/internal IO and MMA. BB-H contains another controller "HSTC" which controls a data transfer between a host and all components except the external IOs. BB-R asserts "FreeS" when it can accept a request from Bus-S. BB-S asserts "FreeW" ("FreeR") when it can accept a write (read) request from Bus-M. A bus transaction on Bus-M consists of the following four phases.
-Arbitration phase is the first cycle when a bus master asserts a request signal.
When more than one master requests, only the master with the highest priority goes into request phase in the next cycle. "ReqS", "ReqM", and "ReqI" are request signals on Bus-M for DMA transfer from/to SDRAM. The signals are asserted by BB-H, BB-M, and BB-I respectively. "ReqH" is a request asserted by BB-H for normal (non-DMA) data transfer. The requests are ordered by priority as follows: ReqM ≺ ReqI ≺ ReqS = ReqH. -Request phase is the next cycle after the arbitration phase. A bus master passes the address and other control signals to a bus slave. -Ready phase is the cycle were the data is ready to be transferred. " DenO" ("DenI") is asserted when the write (read) data is ready to transfer in the next cycle. -Transfer phase is the next cycle after the ready phase. "Pack" is asserted when the data is transferred between BB-H and a bus bridge, such as BB-M and BB-I, in the next cycle. Data is transferred between a master and a slave.
In Takayama et al. [1998] , the authors verified this design using a "navigated" model checking algorithm in which state traversal is restricted by navigation conditions provided by the user. Therefore, their methodology is not complete, that is, it may fail to prove the correctness even if the property is true. Moreover, the navigation conditions are usually not automatically generated. Since our model checker can only accept the SMV language, we translated this abstracted Verilog code into 9,500 lines of SMV code.
In order to compare our model checker to others, we tried to verify this design using two state-of-the-art model checkers-Yang's SMV [Yang et al. 1998 ] and NuSMV [Cimatti et al. 1998 ]. We implemented the cone of influence reduction for NuSMV, but not for Yang's SMV. Both NuSMV+COI and Yang's SMV failed to verify the design. On the other hand, our system abstracted 144 symbolic variables and using three refinement steps was successfully able to verify the design. During the verification, we discovered a bug that had not been discovered before.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented a novel abstraction refinement methodology for symbolic model checking. The advantages of our methodology have been demonstrated by experimental results. We are currently applying our technique to verify other large examples. We believe that our technique is general enough to be adapted to other forms of abstraction.
There are many interesting avenues for future research: Our current work concentrates on two directions: First, we are extending the refinement methodology to full ACTL. This requires to extend the notion of counterexamples beyond paths and loops. Results in this direction are reported in Clarke et al. [2001] . Since the symbolic methods described in this paper are not tied to representation by BDDs, we are also investigating how they can be applied to recent work on symbolic model checking without BDDs [Biere et al. 1999] . and highly effective BDD libraries such as CUDD [Somenzi 2001 ] have been developed.
